Epistemic Responsibility By Lorraine Code Subjects: Philosophy, Epistemology, Ethics, Sociology Of Knowledge Paperback : 9781438480527, 306 pages, November 2020 Paperback $34.95 Alternative formats available from: Google Play Amazon Kindle RedShelf Read Excerpt View Table of Contents Request Desk or Examination Copy Request a Media Review Copy 2003. Given that we say of psychotic and delusional believers that they cant help it or that their rational faculties are taken over, some suggest that this indicates reasons-responsiveness is a form of control (McCormick 2011, 175176; McHugh 2013, 144).Footnote 7. Now, think of the victim of gaslighting, who comes to doubt that her memory is reliable. Ill argue that, while Harts account provides a good answer to some versions of the standard objection, it faces an objection that parallels the one I raised for reasons-responsiveness accounts of responsibility for belief. sharing sensitive information, make sure youre on a federal Its easiest to state this account not in terms of responsibility for belief simpliciter, but in terms of responsibility for a belief that has a certain epistemic status, such as being justified or unjustified, rational or irrational. In Levinas's perspective the Self's responsibility for the Other is unlimited and unquestionable: it is the primary principle of human existence. Sam and Ruth do, of course, still meet condition (i), i.e., they fail to recognise a risk that a reasonable person would have. 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Again its plausible that such a person is not responsible for her belief, given the malign influence of Soviet propaganda on such a persons sense of who to trust and ability to assess the evidence. Owens, D.J. Feldman, Richard. A scientific consensus is reliable because many different individuals with many different kinds of expertise have played a role in stress testing and in contributing to it. There is much to say about this question, but for the purposes of this paper it can be left undefined when someone counts as caring sufficiently about the truth, as its intuitively clear in particular cases whether someone cares enough about the truth. This does not, of course, suffice for a defence of criminal culpability for negligence, just an answer to a key objection to it. This challenge is raised by the fact that culpability requires more than just a bad act. Attributing responsibility involves holding someone accountable for his presumed wrongdoings, making judgments on whether the . : In this paper, I argue that we can make progress in our understanding of responsibility for belief by thinking about it in parallel with another kind of responsibility: legal responsibility for criminal negligence. Simester, A.P. : Harts idea is that the capacities that determine whether we could have helped it, in the sense that the criminal law cares about, include the capacity to recognise risk. (3) We lack control over what we believe. The problem with this approach is that it simply pushes the question back a step. The standard objection to criminal negligence, in brief, is that that criminal culpability requires awareness of wrongdoing, but that this isby definitionabsent in cases of negligence (Turner 1936, 3748; Williams 1961, 122123; Hall 1963). This obligation to "know well" is what philosophers have termed "epistemic responsibility." In this innovative and eclectic study, Lorraine Code explores the possibilities inherent in this. Oxford: Hart. Check out our Practically Cheating Calculus Handbook, which gives you hundreds of easy-to-follow answers in a convenient e-book. People often do have this capacity, and Harts fundamental point is that we dont say that agents couldnt have helped it but take a risk unless we have a specific reason for thinking they lack this capacity (a faulty memory, low intelligence, etc.). Again this looks plausible. 3), and describe how Harts account has been adjusted to overcome this problem. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. , Publisher As with Harts account of negligence, we must supplement the reasons-responsiveness idea with a reference to concern. In both of these two cases, therefore, my account again gives the right result. . This is enough to illustrate the role played by concern for the truth in my account of epistemic responsibility. A sweeping chapter-wise outline of the content of this book is the following. This objection, whichfollowing Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd (2011, 150)we can call the standard objection, is that criminal culpabilityand the prospect of state punishmentis inappropriate if the defendant lacks awareness. One might think an appeal to an additional ownership condition (see footnote 6) might deal with my cases, i.e., one might claim that the believers see themselves as responsible for, and thereby owning, the processes in the first set of cases but not the latter. We expect parents to vet the people in whose care they leave their children, for example. The term Epistemic comes from philosophy and means: namely the degree of belief in the occurrence of the state of affairs, the willingness to act on its assumption, a degree of support or confirmation, or similar [1]. Please try your request again later. Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes: Complete Text of Model Penal Code. Others point to what we say about beliefs that are not responsive to reasons, such as psychotic or delusional beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Being good or bad at gathering evidence isnt directly relevant to whether ones beliefs are good or bad responses to the evidence. The difference is that, whereas criminal culpability is a matter of whether ones behaviour manifests insufficient concern for others interests, epistemic responsibility, Ill suggest, is a matter of whether ones beliefs manifest insufficient concern for the truth. Consider R.A. Duffs example of a man whos in the pub with his friends and forgets to turn up to his own wedding, thus manifesting an utter lack of concern for his bride and their marriage (1990, 163); Duff continues: Had he cared at all for her, he could not have forgotten their wedding (ibid.). Belief Control and Intentionality. Synthese 188 (2): 145163. Ought implies can does not state that one can only be obliged to if one can voluntarily, just that one can only be obliged to if one can (for this point, see Chuard and Southwood 2009, 5; McHugh 2012, 3.2). Virgo. The complete account of when concern for the truth is sufficient will depend on what epistemic norms there are on belief and the strength of those norms, which is a question for normative epistemology. Ego is driving. That problem was that a mere failure to exercise a capacity to recognise risk is not the kind of thing that can, by itself, explain why someones unjustified risk-taking speaks badly of him. Harts important and influential account of criminal negligence (Sect. Epistemic probability is incomplete information about how probabilities arise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence. CoursematerialsonEpistemicResponsibility Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief" and the outline of that article that your instructor provided would be a good place to start when thinking about what sort of duties might be involved in this scenario. Condition (i) is objective, because it doesnt take into account the defendants capacities; it only considers whether a hypothetical reasonable person would have taken the precautions the defendant failed to. Its plausible that, in these cases, the belief in question is influenced by a non-reasons-responsive process and that the believer is not responsible for it. Steup, Matthias. I then give some options for responding to it (Sect. Levy, Neil. Alston claims that ought implies can means epistemic oughts require direct voluntary control over our beliefs (1985, 64; 1988, 259). Other examples are beliefs formed under the influence of propaganda.Footnote 8 For example, consider someone who, having grown up in the Soviet Union under Stalin, believes that Western criticism of the Moscow show trials is merely part of a capitalist plot to subvert communism. 8). The adjective 'epistemic' signifies that the kind of responsibility we are dealing with is attached to practices that aim at producing true beliefs (Pritchard, 2021, p. 5515). It elucidates how we can be held responsible for our doxastic attitudes even if we don't have voluntary control over them. We do this by criticising other believers as gullible or biased, and by trying to persuade others to revise their beliefs. 2006. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Criminal Law: The General Part. 2). Tadros, Victor. An exception is Owens, who claims that reasons-responsiveness suffices for responsibility but not control (2000, 123126). 2nd ed. writing sample admissions essay. Epistemic responsibility, or the belief that responsibility may be applied to beliefs, has been challenged by several philosophers as of late. 2013. They were at the mercy of its popping back into their minds, which it did not (2009, 78). We can now return to the cases that posed a problem for reasons-responsiveness accounts. And cultivating skills of evidence assessment looks too distantly related to whether a belief is a good response to the evidence to ground responsibility. In the matrix, for example. Feel like "cheating" at Calculus? For additional information, or to request that your IP address be unblocked, please send an email to PMC. Introduction. It looks appropriate to say of C that she couldnt have helped it. For example, some people have the epistemic practice of asking a lot of questions and critically assessing the responses they get. Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life. Ethics 115 (2): 236271. Was Sir William Crookes Epistemically Virtuous? Alexander and Ferzan give a response to Hart, but its one that doesnt really engage with Harts fundamental point. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. Proponents of option (c) point out that we can control what we believe indirectly, by acting in ways aimed at influencing our beliefs. Duff, R.A. 1990. It may not be initially clear how its possible for someone to manifest the same kind of insufficient concern when he is unaware that he is putting someone at risk.Footnote 21 However, I think closer attention shows that failures to recognise risk can indeed manifest insufficient concern even though they are inadvertent and not chosen. Sorry, there was a problem loading this page. Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law. Sam and Ruth go to greet their guests, initially planning on returning to the bathtub in a few moments. 2).Footnote 11 I will assume this standard account of what distinguishes negligence from recklessness, as it naturally leads on to the objection to criminal negligence that will be my focus. Shipping . 8). He suggests that a grossly negligent agent has failed, though not deliberately, to take the most elementary precautions that the law requires him to take in order to avoid harm to others (Hart 1961, 147, my italics). What We Owe to Each Other. An example is what Hart calls role-responsibilitythe responsibilities a person bears in virtue of having a certain role, such as the responsibility a ships captain has qua captain for the condition of his ship (1968, 212214). 2016. They did have the capacity or the power to remember about their child, and soon Harts accountthey could have prevented putting their child at risk. : This is because it remains possible that evaluative epistemic facts supervene on naturalistic ones. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This suggests that, whereas we have control over what we do, we lack control over what we believe. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness. But since they are jointly inconsistent, one of them has to go. . A recent version of the standard objection, given by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, frames it in terms of control. Responsibility for Believing. Synthese 161 (3): 357373. And this looks very plausible. We further argue for a fine-grained, context-specific analysis of cognitions within the five components. Read instantly on your browser with Kindle Cloud Reader. One such obstacle is social and epistemic injustice. Alexander and Ferzan claim that, even despite Sams and Ruths genuine moral flaws, they cannot be held culpable for their childs death because it was caused by their forgetting, and their forgetting was not something over which they had the relevant kind of control. Lets consider the first set of cases: beliefs resulting from wishful thinking and confirmation bias. 1968. Various historical and cultural factors are taken into account and are studied before creating new knowledge. Top subscription boxes right to your door, 1996-2022, Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates, Learn more how customers reviews work on Amazon. We argue that integrating these topics into psychological models of epistemic cognition is likely to improve the explanatory and predictive power of these models. government site. Check out our Practically Cheating Statistics Handbook, which gives you hundreds of easy-to-follow answers in a convenient e-book. Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1): 137. 2000. Figuring out which claim to reject is the puzzle of epistemic responsibility.Footnote 1. The puzzle Ive outlined differs from a related argument given by Alston, who claims that our lack of control over belief means that we should reject epistemic oughtsi.e., claims about what we ought to believe (1985, 64ff. This article presents a novel challenge to epistemic internalism. For more examples, see Simester et al. The problem is not with those who fail to meet condition (ii), i.e., those who lack a capacity to recognise risk, such as the defendant in Elliot v. C. The fact that someone like C lacks an ability to recognise risk plausibly does explain why her risk-taking does not speak badly of her. The defender of the reasons-responsiveness view might claim here that there is a sense in which, or a degree to which, in the first set of cases, the beliefs in question originate in a reasons-responsive process, such as reasoningeven if this process is influenced by non-reasons-responsive processes (wishful thinking; confirmation bias). First, the requirement of awareness of action (Mele 2010; Sliwa 2017). People with Tourette syndrome, for example, are excused from responsibility for swearing when this is a result of their illness, and thus something over which they do not have control. Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 155 (1): 127155. This obligation to "know well" is what philosophers have termed "epistemic responsibility." In this innovative and eclectic study, Lorraine Code explores the possibilities inherent in this concept as a basis for understanding human attempts to know and understand the world and for discerning the nature of intellectual virtue. 1011), Peels (2017, Chap. Alexander and Ferzans claim is that negligent defendants like Sam and Ruth lack this ability because they are unaware that they are taking a risk; because they have forgotten about their child, they cannot, according to Alexander and Ferzan, be guided by a demand to not put their child at risk. A schizophrenic whose propensity to believe conspiracy theories is a symptom of her illness doesnt manifest insufficient concern for the truth, but a kind of psychological breakdown that impairs her ability to think and reason clearly and assess the evidence as a healthy person can. Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. Why it is supposed to amount to control is not always clear. One might worry that such defendants are not clear cases of negligent defendants, but are instead more plausibly thought of as reckless. Posner, Richard A. There was a problem loading your book clubs. Harts influential capacity-based account of culpability. For, these are all phenomena that are truth-conducive: they generally help scholars in getting (closer) to the truth in the sense of being informed about the world in and around us. Epistemic courage, for example, is an instance of the character trait of courage, whereas open- Before discussing the epistemic virtues, however, let us start mindedness is, by definition, epistemic. More informally, if your belief is unjustified because you dont care enough about the truth of the matter, then youre on the hook, youre responsible, and its appropriate to hold you to account and criticise you for holding that belief. Oxford: Hart Publishing. still fail to engage in the prevention of pending epistemic harms. This case is controversial, and we shouldnt presume that a justification of criminal culpability for negligence should justify it in this case (see footnote 22 below). People act negligently, according to the standard account, when they take a risk that meets two conditions, (i) the risk is unjustified, and (ii) they are unaware of the risk, but should have been. For example, the epistemic standards we employ in our evaluations . I. Epistemic Contextualism 2 First we shall examine some evidence that James was sympathetic to epistemic contextualism. 1). An example of epistemic justice, incorporating both testimonial and hermeneutical justice, is the case of Kingston General Hospital (KGH) in Ontario, Canada. Lack of awareness that one is taking a risk does not plausibly result, on its own, in the lack of control that Alexander and Ferzan allege it does. After viewing product detail pages, look here to find an easy way to navigate back to pages you are interested in. (3) seems initially plausible too. (3) We lack control over what we believe. Philosophers attempt to deny (3) in two main ways. However, the network of epistemic cooperation is affected by social obstacles. Hurd, Heidi M. 2014. A victim of gaslighting might believe that her memory is faulty, but plausibly she is not responsible for this belief, and shouldnt be criticised for holding it. Moore, Michael S., and Heidi M. Hurd. The problem with this strategy is that it brings with it the demand to either provide an error theory or an alternative explanation of the epistemic evaluation phenomena we canvassed above. If mere origination in a reason-responsive process suffices for responsibility, this would meancorrectlythat we are responsible for the first set of beliefs. Epistemic Responsibility. This work was fundedby a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship. According to Bakhtin's perspective the Ego cannot escape responsibility uniqueness and integrity. 2016. Hieronymi, Pamela. In the criminal case too, forgetting clearly looks like it can manifest the lack of concern relevant to culpability, at least in some cases. Its conceivable that the controlling partner arranges the evidence so that the victim is perfectly justified in doubting her memory. Another example is the much discussed case of State v. Williams (1971), in which a Native American couple were convicted of manslaughter for failing to seek medical attention for their obviously seriously ill son, who went on to die, because they thought he only had a toothache (and, at least in part, because they feared the authorities would take their son away).Footnote 10 In both of these two cases, the defendants failed to take precautions against risks because they were unawarebut should have been awareof those risks. In these respects, concern for the truth is like concern for a person. 1963. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this kind of example to me. Discover more of the authors books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more. Similarly, the 'patient expert' may develop a deep understanding of their condition . We can find in Hart, Ill suggest, an argument to the effect that it is too restrictive. 1994. 1998. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. The plausibility of Harts response can be brought out by comparing Alexander and Ferzans case of Sam and Ruthwho intuitively do seem culpableto the case of Elliott v. C (A Minor) (1983).Footnote 17 C, the defendant, was a 14-year-old girl of low intelligence, who set fire to a shed by igniting white spirit, and was convicted of criminal damage. In order to see this, we need to look at how Harts account can be improved to overcome Simesters objection. Social epistemology deals with the social aspects of knowledge production. From this new perspective, Code poses questions about knowledge that have a different focus from those traditionally raised in the two leading epistemological theories . Finally (Sects. 1962. Epistemic injustice breaks the cooperative chain and harms society and individuals in equal measure. I support my proposal that Duhem is a virtue-responsibilist by arguing that his rejection of the possibility of our producing a perfect theory reflects the key responsibilist virtue of intellectual humility. Additional gift options are available when buying one eBook at a time. Taking Control of Belief. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2): 169183. Im not considering cases like that because they wouldnt be non-reasons-responsive beliefs. In this example, which I take it illustrates a familiar kind of situation, Emma realises that she has been mistaken about what Mr. Knightley means to her. Tadros, Victor. I am grateful to Lucy Campbell for this point. Simester. Lets return to how this improves on Harts account. To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds toupgrade your browser. I start by outlining the puzzle about responsibility for belief in more detail (Sect. For example, we gather evidence and we cultivate our intellectual virtues, such as our skills of evidence assessment.Footnote 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This kind of account crucially relies on the claim that insufficient concern can be manifested by a failure to recognise risk, which may be initially difficult to understand. Something went wrong. 2012. Abstract. Merriam writing the methodology chapter under the influence of hobbies, dreams for the lecture- plus- feedback group were 5. The aim of this paper is to use Sir William Crookes researches into psychical phenomena as a sustained case study of the role of epistemic virtues within scientific enquiry. Shared Epistemic Responsibility - Volume 18 Issue 4. . 2007. Hart, H.L.A. Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Nos 28 (4): 419434. Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief. Philosophical Studies 114 (1): 4779. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-019-09507-7, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-019-09507-7. 31 percent of students from four learners and scientific language, 1. , Print length Rate this book Write a Review Friends & Following What we did that the review: Something that is awkward or confusing and misplaced position on ontological status of academic language. The next step is to adopt a questioning and inquiry before you deliver a speech. : Instead of understanding mens rea purely in terms of the defendants awareness of the consequences of his actions, Hart argues that we should understand it in terms of the defendants capacities to do what the law requires. Epistemic responsibility is commonly applied not just to the moment of forming a particular belief, but rather is taken to describe how we ought to conduct ourselves more generally as inquirers who seek epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding about the world. The irresponsibility illustrated in this example refers to a specific kind of responsibility: epistemic responsibility. : , Language The parallel idea in the epistemic case would be that we are, qua believers, responsible for the epistemic condition of our beliefs, i.e., for whether they are justified or rational.Footnote 2. Such a person would typically describe himself as extremely concerned about the truth, but in a given case his patterns of reasoning and belief formation might make it clear that he is instead motivated by a desire to discover secrets and plots and to be the person who found it all out, or by a desire to uphold a very general world-view or ideology. Accessibility Comment: This is a great paper on epistemic responsibility about belief. 2008. But one has no control at such moments over what one is adverting to or is conscious of: try thinking of what you are not thinking of, but should be! (2009, 83). Individuals therefore have significant epistemic responsibilities when it comes to their health and wellbeing and (perhaps even more) the health and wellbeing of those who are dependent on them. Alston, William P. 1985. But they get so absorbed in greeting the guests that they forget about the child, who drowns in the bathtub (Alexander and Ferzan 2009, 77). Epistemic (Ir)responsibility. J.W.C. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2): 312334. Need help with a homework or test question? We seem to be responsible for our beliefs in a distinctively epistemic way. This is typically done by the abusive partner challenging her recollections, saying things like youre very tired, youre not at your best, youve been very forgetful recently. The site is secure. Alexander Greenberg. The term "epistemic injustice" was introduced to the literature in the monograph of that name, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Fricker 2007, cited under Epistemic Injustice ("Testimonial," "Hermeneutical," and More)), by Miranda Fricker, and in precursor papers (from 1998 and 2003).The book draws on diverse philosophical materialschiefly, the . I think the account Ive put forward can give a much more natural explanation of these cases. Hank explains epistemic responsibility and the issues it raises with everything from rel. In brief, the account of negligence that improves on Harts account grounds culpability in a (lack of) concern for others interests, whereas my account of epistemic responsibility grounds responsibility for belief in a (lack of) concern for the truth. Hart points out that the standard objection assumes that we must indeed say that such a person could not have helped it. This is not a good response to Hart because it doesnt provide any reason to think that someone who is merely unaware that he is taking a risk genuinely lacks the capacity to recognise that risk. Third, we should not think of concern for the truth as only operating consciously. Likewise in the epistemic case, being role-responsible for the epistemic condition of our beliefs requires that we are capable of being responsible for whether our beliefs are justified or rational. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. For more examples, I invite readers to consider all of the times they have forgotten engagements with people because they didnt really want to see them, or when they have failed to notice that they are offending people because they were too engrossed in being right. Condition (ii) refers to the defendants capacities, and it is our focus. 3. To define this notion of epistemic responsibility, I have introduced the concept of epistemic fault. The more fundamental way is through Brownian motion, a type of stochastic process. The gap between what is measured and what is thought to be true is achieved through development of an epistemic probabilistic framework. Epistemic Responsibility means acknowledging direct control and accountability for the quality of your personal, subjective experience of reality, as well as the impact your beliefs, desires and actions have upon others in ever increasing circles. For my own part, Im somewhat ambivalent about whether reasons-responsiveness is best thought of as a form of control, but my objection applies whether or not it is. Chuard, Philippe, and Nicholas Southwood. A common use of the term is to define how much support is given by all the available evidence; it can be measured in degrees of belief or degrees of rational belief. A Theory of Negligence. The Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1): 2996. 2008. Hart does not say this in so many words, but it is implied. 1. Bethesda, MD 20894, Web Policies For ease of illustration, I will focus on justification, but to the extent that other epistemic statuses, such rationality or reasonableness, are distinct from justification, we will be able to make analogous claims about responsibility for beliefs that have these statuses. Examples of Bakhtin and Levinas illustrate that epistemic responsibility takes on different forms. document. 2002. Thus, if we understand the reasons-responsiveness model as holding that mere origination in a reasons-responsive process is sufficient for responsibility, it gives us the wrong result in the second set of cases, implausibly classifying the mentally ill and victims of gaslighting and propaganda as responsible for their beliefs. An account of responsibility for belief based on this modelone which is grounded in the believers concern for the truthgives a plausible account of which beliefs were responsible for and which were not. Simester, 227258. Ill argue that this account still faces a problem, but the problem it faces points towards a more plausible account of responsibility for belief. 2). Consider the captains role-responsibility for the condition of his ship. Epistemic exploitation occurs when members of a marginalized group are expected or required to educate members of privileged groups about injustices that are faced by those who share their social identity (Berenstain 2016; Davis 2016; Spivak 1999; Andre Lorde 1995, 2007). Give reasons and perhaps examples to defend your response. Despite growing interest in epistemic misbehavior in the literature of business ethics, the question of epistemic responsibility has been neglected. About this product. Husak, Douglas. (Essay) On W.K. We start by introducing the idea of echo chambers. So, our intuitions about responsibility dont track reasons-responsiveness; reasons-responsiveness cant ground responsibility for belief.Footnote 9. ; 1988). Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Puzzle of Epistemic Responsibility We can understand the puzzle created by responsibility for belief as an inconsistent triad, three plausible but jointly incompatible claims: (1) We are responsible for our beliefs. My focus is on this objection because Harts account of criminal culpability for negligence was developed in response to it (specifically, the early version in Turner 1936, 3748). To be responsible for his action, John must be aware of what he is doing. London: Stevens. On the account I propose, one is epistemically responsible for the epistemic status of ones beliefs only insofar as they manifest ones concern for the truth, or lack thereof. With this distinction in mind, does the test on which Husak relies test for dispositional belief, or would it also be passed by someone who merely has a disposition to believe? , Screen Reader Indeed, Alexander and Ferzans case of Sam and Ruth looks exactly like such a case: they forget about the risk because they were narcissistically engrossed in their party, and didnt care enough about their child.Footnote 22. These probabilities can be: One example of the use of epistemic probability is to assign probabilities to the possible truth of a proposed law of physics. The study of the nature and grounds of knowledge is called epistemology, and one who engages in such study is an epistemologist. (2) also seems plausible, given that showing that one lacks control in relation to some behaviour typically excuses responsibility for that behaviour. This feature provides the answer to the problem Harts account faced. Blameworthy Belief: A Study in Epistemic Deontologism. Alexander and Ferzan dont explicitly define control. 2008. Research proposal topic examples for writng a research paper. This feature of my account enables it to give a plausible account of which of our beliefs we are responsible for, and so represents an improvement on the reasons-responsiveness account. Ethical Values in the Financial Services Sector, Fricker - Epistemic Injustice Power and the Ethics of Knowing, A Virtue Epistemology of the Internet: Search Engines, Intellectual Virtues and Education, Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement and Control, Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, The Game You Are in: Misleading through Social Norms and What's Wrong with It, EPISTEMIC INSOUCIANCE (Open access published version), How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions, The Nature and Limits of Skeptical Criticism, On the epistemological potential of Worrall's structural realism, On epistemic responsibility while remembering the past: the case of individual and historical memories, The Philosophy of Group Polarization (Book manuscript), Oxford Bibliographies: Intellectual Virtues by Crerar, Allen, Battaly, On some analogies between the counterexamples to modus ponens (and modus tollens), The Virtues of Truth: On Democracy's Epistemic Value, Epistemic Vices in Organizations: Knowledge, Truth, and Unethical Conduct, Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence, The Development and Validation of the Epistemic Vice Scale, Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation, Epistemic justice as a virtue in hermeneutic psychotherapy. 2007. Some Pascalians propose combining pragmatic and epistemic factors in a two-stage process. Ryan, Sharon. Some have understood it in terms of sensitivity to reasons, i.e., a belief that p is reasons-responsive just in case one would revise it if one no longer had reason to believe that p (or if one no longer took oneself to have reason to believe that p).Footnote 5 Others have understood the relevant reasons-responsiveness in terms of beliefs resulting from reasons-responsive processes. Academia.edu uses cookies to personalize content, tailor ads and improve the user experience. : Several potential obstacles to virtue theories in general, and to this new application in particular, are considered and rejected. Greenberg, A. Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence. Image: Voyajer at the English-language Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons 2009. As we saw above, how much one cares about someone can be manifested by inadvertent behaviour, and not just by what one is aware of doing. Alexander, Larry, and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan. Epistemic Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance, and Accountability The epistemic expectations regarding authors and reviewers respond to the obligations derived from their respective professional functions. We often hold each other to account for the beliefs that we hold. [1] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Addresses across the entire subnet were used to download content in bulk, in violation of the terms of the PMC Copyright Notice. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point. With wishful thinking, the overriding concern is what one wants to be the case; with confirmation bias, the overriding concern is ones interest in ones initial judgement being correct. Virtue theories have become influential in ethics and epistemology. Full content visible, double tap to read brief content. For helpful comments on previous drafts, Id like to thank Lucy Campbell, Findlay Stark, Hallvard Lillehammer, Sophie Archer, Daniel Whiting, Conor McHugh, Antony Duff, Sandra Marshall, Christopher Cowley, and an anonymous reviewer from Criminal Law and Philosophy, as well as to Jill Flohil for helpful and diligent editing. The difference between the cases is plausibly precisely to do with the differing capacities to recognise risk. For views of this kind, see Pettit and Smith (1996), Scanlon (1998, 1822), Smith (2005, esp. The application of the concept in the context of mental health is less explored. 43 Lehrer, 'Freedom, Preference and Autonomy'. Keywords: Ad hominem - Logical universality - Virtue epistemology - Virtue ethics. American Law Institute. This case is also used to illustrate where Harts account gets it right by Simester (2000, 104) and Stark (2016, 184). And, once this is accepted, it becomes plausible that the kind of insufficient concern relevant to criminal culpability can also be manifested by failures to recognise risk. This notion of epistemic fault relies on a theoretical framework which combines a typology of eight 'epistemic values', a normative stance regarding these values, and a dispositional approach to epistemic virtues and vices. But responsibility for belief looks hard to understand because we seem to lack control over our beliefs. The Ethics of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3): 667695. On this understanding, a belief is reasons-responsive just in case its formed or revised by a reasons-responsive process.Footnote 6 I will focus on the latter kind of view, though the objection Ill make applies to the former as well. Oxford: Oxford University Press. b. TheStructuresofEgoism&Consequentialism (handout) The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law. Second, we offer epistemic advice, telling people, for example, not to believe everything they read on the internet. Here, we aim to apply the concept of epistemic injustice in attributing responsibility to patients with borderline personality disorder. For example: life-insurance. In both cases, my account again gives the right result. There was an error retrieving your Wish Lists. ); it cannot explain why their risk-taking speaks badly of them, which it must if its going to explain why its justified to hold them culpable. eBay item number: 185691540404. I challenge Ivanovas criticism of Stump by arguing that she not distinguish between reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemologies. With the former cases, we want to say that the believer is at fault, and that his unjustified belief speaks badly of him epistemically. 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